西方哲学史レポート| The Categories

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西方哲学史レポート [pdf]

岩熊幸男先生

経済・経営　 01121123

The Categories

Introduction:

What is the subject of the Categories? In ordinary usage κατηγορ?α , rendered in English as ‘category', meant nothing more than ‘a predicate'. The ten categories, then, are ten predicates. What sort of predicates, however, and predicates also of what? Let us first raise another point here. If we ask how Aristotle came by them, the critics are not in agreement. The following seems, on the whole, the most plausible view of the matter. All the predicates which can be attached to that subject fall under one or other of the ten head, from the supreme question: what is the object of here perceived? down to such as a subordinate question, dealing with mere externalities, as : what has he on? What equipment or accoutrements, e.g. shoes or weapons? Other questions are concerned with his qualities and his size(white, instructed in grammar, so many feet tall) , under the head of relation(related to what) come answers in which a term such as Greater or Less, Handsomer or Uglier, implies a reference to an object or objects of comparison. The “when” is explained by a Yesterday or To-morrow, the Doing and Suffering by the sentences: “He is cutting or burning,” “he is being cut or burnt.” The enumeration is intended to comprise the maximum of predicates which can be assigned to any thing or being. A maximum, be it observed for it can hardly be by chance that the full number is found in only two passages of the work, while the two which are at once the most special and the least important, those relating to Having, or possession, and to Lying, or attitude, are in every other case passed over without mention. And indeed, what sense could there be in speaking of the possessions of a stone or a piece of iron, or of the attitude of a sphere or a cube? We further observe that several others of the categories are often lumped together under the one name of “affections” while others are collectively designated “Motions”. An individual person if habitually clothed in some particular way in all or part of his body; he (and perhaps his horse also) are the only Subjects that are ever so clothed. Moreover animal are the only Subjects, and among them man is the principal Subject, whose changes of posture are frequent, various determined by internal impulses, and at the same time interesting to others to know. Hence we may infer that when Aristotle lays down the Ten Categories, as summa Genera for all predications, which can be made about any given Subject, the Subject, which he has wholly, or at least principally, in his mind, is an individual Man. We understand, then, how it is that he declares Habere and Jacere to be so plain as to need no further explanation. What is a man's posture? What is his clothing or equipment? are questions understood by every one.

Aristotle's Categories:

I . Things are equivocally named, when they have the name only in common, the definition (or statement of essence) corresponding with the name being different. For instance, while a man and a portrait can properly both be called ‘animals' these are equivocally named. For they have the name only in common, the definitions (or statements of essence) corresponding with the name being different. For if you are asked to define what the being an animal means in the case of the man and the portrait, you give in either case a definition appropriate to that case alone.

Things are univocally named, when not only they bear the same name bur the name means the same in each case ? has the same definition corresponding.

Things are ‘derivatively' named that derive their own name from some other, that is given a new verbal form, as, for instance, ‘grammarian' from ‘grammar' from ‘heroism' ‘hero' and so on.

II . We may or we may not combine what we call words, expressions and phrases. Combine them; you have propositions ? for instance, ‘man runs' or ‘man wins' ? while examples of uncombined forms are ‘man', ‘ox' , ‘runs' and ‘wins' and the like. But as for the things that are meant, when we thus speak of uncombined words, you can predicate some of a subject, but they never are present in one.

III A word upon predicates here. When you predicate this thing or that of another thing as of a subject, the predicates then of the predicate will also hold good of the subject. We predicate ‘man' of a man; so of ‘man' do we predicate ‘animal.' Therefore, of this or that man we can predicate ‘animal' too. For a man is both ‘animal' and ‘man.' When genera are co-ordinate and different, differentiae will differ in kind.

IV . Each uncombined word or expression means one of the following things: ? what( or Substance), how large(that is, Quantity), what sort of thing( that is, Quality), related to what(or relation), where( what is, Place), when( or Time), in what attitude( Posture, Position), how circumstanced (State or Condition), how active, what doing(or Action), how passive, what suffering( Affection). Not one of these terms in itself will involve any positive statement. Affirmations, as also denials, can only arise when such terms are combined or united together, each positive or negative statement must either be true or be false.

V . Substance in the truest and strictest, the primary sense of that term, is that which is neither asserted of nor can be found in a subject. We take as examples of this a particular man or a horse. But we do speak of secondary substances ? those within which, being species, the primary or first are included, and those within which, being genera, the species themselves are contained. For instance, a particular man we include in the species called ‘man' and the species itself in its turn is included in the genus called ‘animal.' These, then, are secondary substances, that is to say, man and animal ? otherwise, species and genus. From what we have said it is plain that the name and definition of the predicates can both be affirmed of the subject. Indeed, the definition itself will in no case whatever apply. But in some cases nothing prevents us from using the name of the subject. Suppose we take ‘white' as an instance. Now ‘white' is , no doubt, in a body and thus is affirmed of a body, for a body, for a body, of course, is called ‘white.' The definition, however, of ‘white'?if the color, that is, we call ‘white' ? can never be predicated of any such body whatever.

Ⅵ . To quantity let us turn next. This is either discrete or continuous. Some quantities, moreover, consist of such parts as have relative positions in reference each to the others, while others, on the contrary, consist of such parts as have no such positions. Of quantities that are discrete we may here instance number and speech, of quantities that are continuous line, superficies and solid, to which time and place may be added. Consider the parts of a number. You find there is no common limit at which they may join or unite. For example, two fives will make ten, these however, are wholly distinct; there is no common limit whatever at which these two fives coalesce. And, indeed, in the case of all numbers you never will find such a boundary, common to any two parts, for the parts remain ever distinct. Thus is number discrete, not continuous. (A line is, however, continuous.)

Ⅶ . Let us now turn to Relation. We call a thing relative, when it is said to be such as it is from its being of some other thing or, if not, from its being related to something in some other way. Thus ‘the greater' is said to be greater by reference to something outside it. For, indeed, when we call a thing ‘greater,' we mean by that greater than something. ‘The double' is called what it is from its being the double of something. For ‘double' means double of something. And so with all terms of that kind. Other relatives also there are, such as habit, disposition, perception, position or attitude, knowledge. All these are explained by a reference to something to which they belong, and in no other way whatsoever.

Relatives sometimes have contraries. Virtue is contrary to vice, either term itself being a relative knowledge to ignorance also. By no means all-relative terms can, however, be said to have contraries. ‘Double' and ‘triple' have none, nor, indeed, any terms of that sort.

All relatives have their correlatives. And at times the correlation, however, will not manifestly appear---namely, when a mistake has been made and the correlate itself wrongly stated.

Ⅷ . “By ‘quality' I mean that in virtue of which men are called such and such.”

The word ‘quality' has many senses.

• Let habits and dispositions here constitute one kind of quality.

• The one that leads us to speak of good boxers, good runners, the healthy or sickly.

• The third contains passive qualities and also affections.

• The fourth consists of the forms and the figures of things; add to these also crookedness, straightness and all other qualities like them.

Ⅸ . Action and affection (or passion) have contraries and also degrees. That is, heating is contrary to cooling, as also being cooked to being heated or, again, being pleased to being pained. Thus it is they admit contrariety. Moreover, they allow of degrees; for you can heat or be heated more or less. Hence it follows that both action and affection may admit of variations of degree. Of these categories so much is stated. Posture or position we spoke of, when dealing before with relation. We said that such terms get their names from the attitudes corresponding to them.

Ⅹ . We have now said enough on the subject of the categories that we proposed, and with opposites next we must deal and the various senses of the word. For we call things opposed in four ways--- first of all, as correlatives are, either term of each pair to the other; in the next place, as contraries are; in the third place, as privatives to positives; lastly, as affirmatives to negatives.

? I. ‘Simultaneous' we use in its primary and most correct meaning of third that have come into being together. For neither in that case is prior, nor is either posterior to the other. We mean ‘simultaneous in time.' ‘Simultaneous' in nature we apply to those things where the being of either necessitates that of the other but neither is cause of the other.

XIV. There are sic kinds of what we call motion--- generation, that is, and destruction, increase, diminution, alteration and, finally, changes of place. With a single exception it is plain that all these are distinct from each other.

XV. ‘To have' has a good many meanings. We use it of habits, dispositions and also of all other qualities. Thus we are said to ‘have' virtue, to ‘have' this or that piece of knowledge. And then it is used of a quantity, such as the height a man has. So it is that we say that a man ‘has' a stature of three or four cubits. Again, it is used of apparel; a man ‘has' a cloak or a tunic. Moreover, we use it of things that we ‘have' on some part of the body, a ring on the finger, for instance.

先生、私は日本語と英語が苦手ですが、哲学についてのレポートを書くのは難しいと思います。だから、今、先生から紹介していただいた「 The LOEB classical Library 」の Aristotle 部分を読みました。それは、読んだの Summary です。いま、私は北京に TOEFL の勉強をがんばっていますが、レポートは遅くなりました。申し上げませんでした。

今年、先生の色々なお世話になりまして、誠にありがとうございました。